

## **Beyond Monism and Dualism. Nicolai Hartmann's Ontology in the Context of the Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science**

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The aim of my speech is to consider the relevance of Nicolai Hartmann's ontology for the contemporary philosophy of mind and cognitive science. In the discussions within the framework of the cognitive sciences we can still find the aftermath of two forms of ontological reductionism: (a) naturalistic monism and (b) Cartesian dualism. It seems that the cognitive sciences are still too often based on this unconsciously accepted ontological reductionism. However, we can observe today a rapid development of the philosophy of mind, which could be interpreted as a metatheoretical reflexion on the assumptions of the cognitive sciences. We can paraphrase Hartmann's words on the relation between the theory of cognition and ontology: "there is no cognitive science without the ontology of mind." From the cooperation of the cognitive sciences with the philosophy of mind arises the basis for the contemporary ontology of mind. Since the early 1990s we can observe in the cognitive sciences the change of paradigm called "embodied turn". The old orthodox computation paradigm (which understands the mind as an information processor) has begun to be challenged by the embodied dynamicism and enactivism (which captures the mind in its relation to the whole body understood as a self-organizing dynamic open system existing in a constant relation to its natural and social environment). This new postulated ontology of mind should be situated beyond monism and dualism.

I will argue that Hartmann's critical ontology, which facilitates a stratified understanding of human beings, cognitive processes, and culture without lapsing into any of the two above-mentioned forms of reductionism perfectly corresponds with this tendency. I will try to consider these elements of his ontological analyses of real being that can be useful for the contemporary philosophy of mind and, thus, for the cognitive sciences, like: (1) the processuality of real being (the mind should be understood rather as a set of functions, processes, and states than as a some kind of substance); (2) the non-spatial character of the two highest layers of real being - psychical and spiritual (the questions like "where is the mind located?" or "is the mind located in the brain?" does not make any sense), (3) conducting ontological analyses at the category level rather than at the separate layers level, (4) categorial pluralism, (5) anti-Cartesianism, i.e., the assertion that the mind cannot exist independently of the lower layers and the assertion that we do not have any privileged, transparent and obvious access to our mind, (6) the inability to reduce the higher levels to the lower levels (the inability to reduce mind to the brain) (7) the individuality and uniqueness of real being (two minds which are the same do not exist) and (9) the dialectical relationship between the subjective spirit and the objective spirit (which perfectly agrees with understanding the mind as an open system).

Hartmann's ontology is open to enter into relationship with the particular sciences, so it would certainly not negate the meaning of the cognitive sciences for the philosophical reflection of the ontological structure of being. But to make the results of the cognitive sciences philosophically useful, the relationship should be mutual. The cognitive sciences need the ontology of mind as a metatheory that can provide it with the ontological framework and allows it to ask knowledgeable questions and solve problems. I will present what

Hartmann's ontology offers for the problems discussed in the contemporary philosophy of mind and investigated by the cognitive sciences. For example, on the basis of Hartmann's ontology the problem of artificial intelligence is closely related to the question of the role of organic being as an intermediary between inorganic being and psychical and spiritual being. We can thus ask whether it is possible to create the psychical and spiritual being on the other kind of basis than organic? Also a question about the differences between the mind of man and the mind of animal and the considerations of different kinds of minds, such as the problem of the "personal mind" (and its essential features) gains a solid foundation in Hartmann's distinction between psychical and spiritual being and in his typology of three kinds of spirits (subjective, objective, and objectivized). And, last but not least, in the structure of real being presented by Hartmann the old philosophical problem known as the body-mind issue (psycho-physical problem) actually loses its meaning and is replaced by several specific issues and questions on the relationship between the various layers of real being.